

TRINITY COLLEGE DUBLIN

# Brothers In Arms

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The Electoral Impact of Party Cohesion in three  
countries

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## Introduction

Party cohesion has long been of interest to political observers. Anecdotal evidence suggests that many voters are fascinated by the idea of politics as a blood-sport, and as a struggle for control. Indeed, this may be many casual observers the primary explanation as to why they follow the day-to-day machinations of politicians at all (Robbins, 2014).

They certainly are not the only ones interested. Political writers also seem deeply interested in the internal struggle for control within political parties. In Britain this can be seen both in interest in the final years of New Labour and struggle between Tony Blair and Gordon Brown for the leadership of Labour (Rawnsley, 2010) and in the battles between Gladstone and Disraeli over the direction of the Tory Party (Aldous, 2006). They are not the only ones interested. In Australia the conflict between Kevin Rudd and Julia Gillard for the control of the Labor Party polarised the public and dominated news stories there for years at a time (Kelly, 2014).

These divisions seem to have practical effects on the politics of the day. In Ireland Charles Haughey's efforts to quell opposition to his leadership of Fianna Fáil eventually resulted in a split in the party, with major long-term ramifications for the Irish party system (Collins, 2005). In Britain bitter policy disputes in the Labour Party eventually led to a split in that party, the creation of Britain's third party – the Liberal Democrats – as we know them and, arguably, the explanation for the ease with which Margaret Thatcher won re-election in 1983 and 1987 (Crewe & King, 1995).

These behaviours seem to affect the likelihood of voters actually opting for that party as well. Internal squabbles were seen as directly responsible for the weak result of the Canadian NDP in the Ontario Provincial election in 2014 (“‘The Impact of Party Infighting’ with The Insiders,” 2014). In Ireland struggles for the leadership of Fine Gael was seen as responsible for the scale of their loss in 2002 (Collins, 2010). Something that seems to have such an obvious degree of interest and practical importance to political outcomes would seem to be worthy of study.

## Literature Review

### Definition of Cohesion

Cohesion was defined by Ozbudun as referring to the extent, in any given situation, 'group members can be observed to work together for the group's goal in one and the same way' (Ozbudun, 1970, p. 305). This means, according to Hazan, that cohesion is an objective condition of any kind of party unity (Hazan, 2003). This has several implications. It means that cohesion is reduced if the party does not speak with one voice – even if such division has no 'tangible' impact, such as a vote by certain MPs against the party in parliament. However, for it to matter to voters it must be observable, and the most obvious way of discerning whether party cohesion affects the behaviour is determining whether or not it affects the likelihood of voters actually opting for a party in the ballot box.

In this paper cohesion and unity are used interchangeably, with disunity referring to a lack of cohesion.

### Problem of Variation

Numerous scholars have considered party cohesion, and thought it worth studying. However it is most commonly examined as a dependent variable – as something to be explained in and of itself, and not as a potential explanatory factor for other phenomena. There are a wealth of measures and potential explanations for it in the literature, the most common of which is that originally devised by Rice. He argued that cohesion could be measured by the proportion of each group or party in parliament that deviates from the official line of that group or party (Rice, 1925). While a simple measure, it suffers from two problems. The first problem is that there is almost no variation in this measurement. Even in the nineteenth century cohesion in British parties was relatively high and was approaching levels of near total cohesion by the time that Rice was writing (Eggers & Spirling, 2014). These days in Western countries deviation is very rare – with Depauw and Martin recording the lowest rate of cohesion in New Zealand at 93%, and with it more likely to be over 99% (Depauw & Martin, 2009, p. 105). Even in countries with undeveloped party and parliamentary systems where a norm of cohesive voting behaviour may not have developed very few MPs defect at all on virtually any issue (Tavits, 2009). Such defection seems to be even less likely in situations of any degree of importance. In Israel for instance from party leadership was even less likely on issues relating to the survival of the government, on financial matters and on bills that directly related to the main cleavage of the country. Defections were more likely to occur on more minor issues, and thus of less importance to voters, if they occurred at all (Rahat, 2007).

This problem of lack of variation has resulted in an academic literature that is predominantly concerned with explaining cohesion. Jahn and Oberst have argued that cohesion in most parties is high because of the mere fact that they are parties. By their nature they are a banding together of individuals with common electoral and ideological goals. If they did not agree with one another in spite of being in the same party it would be more remarkable. This would be especially true if the party had a narrow ideological focus (Jahn & Oberst, 2012). Formal leadership structures within parties seem to matter as well. In the European Parliament group leaders account for 7% of total cohesion owing to their political experience (Bailer, Schulz, & Selb, 2010). Others have found that party cohesion is high because parties place a lot of trust in their representatives and their roles, and therefore just assume that whatever policy position is proposed is what they personally and the party generally would want in any case (Andeweg & Thomassen, 2010). Such a calculation is undoubtedly helped by politicians generally being friendly with the people that they work with and not wanting to let them down or be ostracised from the group (Russell, 2012). Other, more 'concrete' factors, have had mixed results. Studies cannot seem to agree for instance on whether large parties should have greater or less cohesion than small parties (Carey, 2007; Sieberer, 2006). On an ad hoc basis the size of the expected parliamentary majority for a bill seems to affect the willingness of MPs to defect from the official party line on it (Linek & Rakušanová, 2005).

### **Electoral effects of cohesion**

Nonetheless, regardless of the lack of variation in the rice index and the factors that seem to increase it, cohesion does seem to have a small but observable effect on the electoral fortunes of candidates and parties. Using survey data and election studies Maravall found that parties with low cohesion in the eyes of voters seemed to do worse than parties with high cohesion, all other things being equal (Maravall, 2008). Maravall was primarily concerned with internal party structure, and as such did not analyse parties relative to others in the party system in which they operate. This means that he only determined that there was an effect, and not the degree of it, or the effect of system context or how much it was meaningful against other factors that we know influence voter choice.

Nevertheless this general finding is consistent with theoretical expectations around the issue. We would expect that voters would reward parties with high cohesion as it increases their certainty about how that party will act when it is in government. A party with no members that ever deviate and in a single-party government would have voters be completely certain about how it would behave in parliament – there is no doubt that it would pass all bills. On non-policy related matters it would mean that the party should be focused on legislating, rather than internal leadership concerns. The more cohesion falls the more this certainty falls and, past a certain level, voters may even stop voting for the party that they would otherwise prefer as they are so uncertain as to how it

would behave that they vote for someone else. This other party may be further away from them on the ideological spectrum, but at least they have a reasonable guarantee as to what it will do and are willing to accept that over a party that may deliver their ideal policy position, or may deliver one very far from their position either.

However looking at individual legislators the story is quite different. Also using election studies Vivyan and Wagner find that rebellious Labour MPs in Britain gain 1.5% of the vote in 2005 relative to their less rebellious colleagues (Vivyan & Wagner, 2012). However this effect was substantively small and was entirely confined to voters who both disliked Tony Blair but approved of the Labour Party generally – which was a fairly small group in any case. This was attributed by the authors as individuals seeking to return the party to old ways and disliked the direction that New Labour brought the party in. Similarly in open list systems being seen as a rebel and the cause of low cohesion seems to help individual legislators get preference votes and return to parliament, as well as ensuring better list placements in the first place by being popular figures (Olivella, Malecki, & Sher, 2013). This means that there may be a collective action problem at work for parties and candidates. It may be good for individual candidates relative to their loyal counterparts, but with enough deviation the overall public perception of the party collapses and everyone, whether loyal or not, pays the price. Still though, the question remains; how much is this directly impacting voters on the whole? Are these candidates merely getting a bigger share of a vote total that they themselves have made smaller?

All of this leads us to a key research question:

*'If the observable level of cohesion in a party falls does the vote share for that party also fall?'*

## Dataset and Methodology

### Dataset and limitations

In order to examine the effect of cohesion on the likelihood of voters actually voting for a particular party a number of election studies were obtained that asked questions relating to perceptions of party cohesion. The election studies were Australia 1987 and 1990, New Zealand 1990, 1993 and 1996 and the Netherlands 1989. These were chosen due to the extremely limited data on the topic. The six studies represent almost the entirety of possible election studies that ask voters this question. Additional work was done on the British elections of 1983, 1987 and 1992, but owing to difficulties with comparability of control variables Britain will not be discussed in this paper. The results of the British case are available on request.

There are further limitations than this as well with the data. The question is not asked of every party in the system – and not even for all relevant parties. In Australia this is only asked for Labor and the two main parties of the Coalition in 1987, and in 1990 not even that, with only the Labor and the Liberals warranting questions. New Zealand is similarly limited. In 1990 the question is only asked of Labour and the National Party – in spite of other parties possessing reasonable support and, in the case of New Labour, actual parliamentary representation. The 1993 study includes four parties – Labour, National, Alliance (which was technically a coalition of four different small parties that agreed to contest elections together) and New Zealand First (NZF), while the 1996 study includes the same four parties – in spite of the change in electoral system rendering several new parties as important to the party system. The Dutch study includes four parties – the Labour Party (PvdA), Christian Democrats (CDA), Liberals (VVD) and Democrats 66 (D66) – the four largest parties in Dutch politics at that time. There were however other relevant actors in Dutch politics at that time.

Nonetheless, the studies consistently ask for the two largest parties, and generally that of other important actors as well. While not perfect, these studies cover parties that received at least 80% of the votes cast in the elections under study.

The other problems are more serious. These countries are certainly not chosen randomly. Australia and New Zealand, in particular, share many similarities and operate quite differently from a consensual democracy like the Netherlands. Similarly, the data is from quite a long time ago, and all relates to the period between 1987 and 1996. How do we know that any effect observed is not specific to political culture in Australasia, or specific to Western democracies around that time period? On the other hand, these countries are all parliamentary democracies – an important consideration when whether a regime is presidential or parliamentary is known to influence the level of cohesion, allowing us to hold this source of variation constant (Sauger, 2009). Ultimately

however, whatever the advantages and disadvantages of using these countries and time periods we have little choice but to use this data. It is the only data available to us, and these simply must be facts to be borne in mind for any conclusions that are drawn.

### Measurement of Variables

The party that respondents voted for in the election was included in all election studies, and this was used as the dependent variable. This was coded in two different ways depending on the model used (outlined below). Firstly new variables were created, so rather than a single variable outlining how a respondent voted with all options several new variables were made, so that voting for a particular party was coded as '1', and voting for anyone else or not voting at all was coded as zero. In Australia this question was asked twice. The first question was for which party did respondents vote for in the lower house of parliament, the second for the upper. For both Australian election studies how respondents voted in lower house elections was used. This was to allow comparability with New Zealand – which is unicameral – and the Netherlands.

Great efforts were made so that the independent variables would be comparable, but sometimes they simply were not exactly the same for one study as they were for the others. Exceptions are given below.

For party cohesion there were two ways of asking the question. All Australian and New Zealand studies asked the question as follows:

*'Would you describe each of the following parties as united or divided?'*

This would be followed by a list of parties in order of their size. This question is phrased in a general way, and by its nature would acquire binary answers.

The Dutch studies asked the question differently. It followed a series of questions about cooperation between political parties in a coalition setting:

*'And next the cooperation within political parties. The PvdA: How good or how bad do you think the cooperation is among PvdA politicians?'*

This question then asks respondents to rank cooperation within the party on a seven-point scale and is repeated for the CDA, VVD and D66. While this is clearly more informative than that asked in the other studies, it is not possible to directly compare the two without transforming this into a binary variable. The lowest three categories (so those that feel cooperation within the party is bad) have therefore been recoded as '1', while other categories – including the middle category – have been recoded to '0'. Additionally this question refers directly to politicians, while the other does not. This



may act as a prompt for voters to disregard any perceptions of cooperation, or lack of it, when thinking about any other aspect of the party. This may include a potential conflict between the leadership and party members who may hold more radical policy views (May, 1973). This means that the Dutch question may not be capturing the same breadth of possible variation as the Australian and New Zealand questions – in spite of not being a binary question. This is something that must be borne in mind for any subsequent analysis.

A number of controls were added, to account for the major schools of voting and to determine whether any electoral effect of cohesion was merely something already accounted for by established theories.

A large number of theorists argue that the economy is what matters to voters. While other factors such as accountability can lessen or enhance its impact – fundamentally the economy and government economic performance is primarily what voters are interested in, and what they will evaluate before even looking at the opposition (Anderson, 2000; Nadeau & Lewis-Beck, 2001; Powell & Whitten, 1993; Tucker et al., 2006). Perhaps voters disapprove of uncohesive parties solely because such parties are incapable of good management as they are so concerned with internal struggles? To account for this possibility, a control variable referring to voter perception of how well the government has managed the economy was added to the model. It is also binary to account for some of the studies coding it as a scale. A good perception was coded as '1', while a poor or neutral one was coded as '0', as with cohesion.

This is not the only model of voting that must be accounted for in any analysis. Party Identification – the idea of feeling close to a particular party and thus being more likely to support them over alternatives, whatever other circumstances, is widely held as a significant factor in the literature (Carsey & Layman, 2006; Converse, 1976; Franklin & Jackson, 1983; Goren, 2005; Mendelsohn, 1996). Such attachments are generally thought of as coming from family socialisation at a young age, and can, based on personal circumstance in life being in general similar to the situation of one's parents, be thought of as rational (Achen, 2002). While party identification may be accounting more for why voters do not regularly change their decision for which party to vote for, rather than why they make that decision in the first place it must still be accounted for in any model of voting behaviour. Additionally it may be that voters, if 'biased' towards particular parties, may only see fault with parties that they were already inclined not to support. There is already evidence of voters having such a 'selective perception' with regard to party ideology. In Britain in 2001 the Conservatives systematically placed the ideological position of themselves close to the centre, and that of other parties further away. Voters also believed that the party was fairly centrist – in spite of

it being the mainstream party furthest away from the median in British politics at that time (Norris & Lovenduski, 2004). It is possible that such perceptions may affect other aspects of party politics other than party ideology – they may see every flaw in their opponents and every criticism of their leadership but remain ignorant of the same issues in the party that they support. To account for this possibility a set of variables was added for party identification, which was in all datasets. If you have an identification with a particular party (or ‘felt close’ to a party) it was coded ‘1’, if not it was coded ‘0’. Strength of party identification was not assessed. Strong adherents of a political party are increasingly few in number with increased dealignment of voters from parties in Western Party systems – including the three countries under study (Dalton & Weldon, 2007).

Finally ideological proximity must be considered as a significant factor in voter choice. This has a long history in political science, dating back to Downs. This idea holds that voters arrange themselves on an ideological spectrum, and then vote for the party whose position is closest to them on that spectrum, and has become known as the spatial model of voting (Downs, 1957; Enelow & Hinich, 1984). This idea is common in the literature; for instance it formed the theoretical framework for the ubiquitous Nominat scores (Poole & Rosenthal, 1985), as well as spatial models of legislative behaviour (Shepsle & Weingast, 1981). It has come under some criticism in favour of more directional models of voting behaviour (Rabinowitz & Macdonald, 1989). However evidence for this alternative is scant in the literature, with scholars claiming either that there is insufficient evidence to make a claim on the validity of either model of voter choice (Lewis & King, 1999), or, more damagingly, that the directional model performs actively worse than the ideological proximity model when tested with real-world data (Taniguchi, 2006). It may even have outcomes exactly the opposite as those claimed by the authors, and comparisons have suffered from an eccentricity effect (Westholm, 1997). Accordingly ideological proximity is the only directly ideological factor that will be considered. This was calculated as follows. Each study asked respondents to place themselves on an ideological scale, all with zero representing as left wing as it is possible to be, and becoming more right wing as the number increased. They also asked respondents in all but one case (Australia in 1990) to place the parties on the same scale. The number that respondents gave to each individual party was then subtracted from the number that respondents gave themselves, in order to obtain the relative distance between respondents and for each party in that election. As the ideological direction of that deviation is not of any particular interest in this case the absolute value of the relative direction of deviation in order to obtain an absolute measure of perceived proximity. Using the absolute value for measuring proximity has precedent (Sommer-Topcu, 2009). This means that the higher the number the further away from the party ideologically the voter perceived themselves to be. Australia in 1990 did not ask for ideological placement of parties – merely for respondents. A

different, albeit similar, measure for this concept was thus created. This study used the ParlGov database for party ideological positions, which aggregates a number of other studies so that problems with any one of them should hopefully be averaged away (Doring & Manow, 2014) as an estimate for an 'objective' placement of Australia's major parties. This measure was then subtracted from the ideological placement of each respondent and an absolute value taken of that number – as before. This measure 'objective' measure is not the same as respondents placement of the party. As with party identification, voters may have selective perception of parties and place parties that they like close themselves regardless of their 'objective' positions. It also does not allow voters to weight their own placement and that of the party by whatever criteria is important to them. For instance a socially 'left' voter that was also fiscally conservative could place themselves on either end of the scale depending on what was more important to them. This measure, by being less focused on the respondents themselves by definition, is also less likely to yield significant results, which in turn makes it less likely to make cohesion insignificant. Nonetheless, there is no alternative to this measure for this study.

Additional and more standard controls were also added to the model. A lag of whether respondents voted for the same party in the last election that they did in the election under study was included in each model. Furthermore age and gender were added to the control model. These sometimes differed slightly. The Dutch study did not ask respondents for their exact age, but did ask for ages with five year brackets. While less exact, it was still used. Additionally in New Zealand in 1993 Alliance and NZF did not exist in the previous election, so no lagged variables of respondents voting for them in the previous election could have been included.

## **Model and Methodology**

To quantitatively assess the hypothesis that the level of cohesion affects the electoral performance of political parties a model was created in order to test this. Three approaches were undertaken.

Firstly voting for a particular party is not a continuous variable and cannot be expressed as such. Linear regression is therefore inappropriate for quantitative analysis in this case. What was done instead was a probit analysis, using having voted for a particular party or not as the dependent variable, and using the binary variable of believing a party to not be united as the only independent variable. A probit analysis was performed as the dependent variable is binary. This would be to establish whether there is any effect worth investigating – if it does not exist on the best possible conditions for it to appear statistically it probably does not exist.

If an effect is found, a further probit model, with controls, was performed. This was done to determine whether the statistical effect of cohesion was 'real', or already captured by already existing commonly held beliefs about why voters make the decisions that they do.

From both of these sets of probit analyses probabilities were calculated, so it is possible to see directly how the probability of voting for a party changes if a respondent perceives that party as disunited over united.

While those probabilities are informative – they do not tell us the entire story. They do not help us to determine how voters will change the decision for which party to vote for *when that probability is put against the probability of that voter voting for any of the alternatives*. To do that, relative risk ratios were calculated from multinomial logit models. A multinomial logit model uses a categorical variable as the dependent variable for statistical model. This was chosen over any of the available alternatives because, while the different parties in any given party system are clearly different, it is almost impossible to quantify the degree of difference between them. While we know that NZ Labour and National parties are clearly different organisations, beyond that it gets murkier. Using this model allows us to bypass this problem completely. The relative risk ratios allow us to determine the 'risk' of a respondent being in one category of the dependent variable over a base category if that dependent variable changed and all of the others included in the dataset remain constant. In this case, it allows us to determine how the cohesion of one party actually affected a respondent's chance of voting for that party over any one of the others if disunity was the only changing factor.

The base category used was always the social democratic party in the party system – NZ Labour, Australian Labor and the PvdA – as it was felt that with their common ideological heritage and trade union links, as well as their common membership of Socialist International meant that they were the party most like those in other countries, and as such comparisons of other parties with them are the most interesting for comparative purposes. This party vote variable would also include not voting as a category, along with voting for any party other than the parties for which questions about cohesion were asked. In general this category was small, and aside from voters for the National Party in Australia in 1990, and voters for the Dutch GreenLeft in 1989 contained almost no respondents at all.

## Results

This paper will focus on the results from two of the elections under study primarily – New Zealand in 1996 and the Netherlands in 1989. The results of analysis from all other studies may be found in the appendix. In general however, they show substantively identical results to the above two studies.

Full probit results can be found in tables 1 and 2. The main results are summarised below. For all parties the baseline models showed statistically significant results. All results indicate a negative relationship between perceptions of party disunity and the likelihood of a voter actually opting for that party in a general election. Substantively however the impact of disunity varies quite considerably however.

In the Netherlands the party whose vote was most affected by disunity was the CDA, which saw the chance of a respondent voting for the CDA fall by 20.2% if they saw the party as disunited. The PvdA recorded a similarly substantively strong effect – with the probability of voting for that party falling by 18.4%. The party with smallest impact was D66, which saw the probability of voting for them fall by 7.94%. The VVD is slightly more affected. If a respondent saw them as disunited, the probability of that respondent voting for them fell by 8.03%. Pseudo r-squared values were low without the effects of known indicators of voter behaviour.

In New Zealand the substantive impact of cohesion seemed to be similar in this election. The negative and statistically significant relationship remained as well. The party with the substantively largest effect was National. Respondents who perceived the National Party as disunited were 22.8% less likely to vote for them. This was a much stronger effect than for the next party – NZF. Respondents who saw them as disunited were 11.2% less likely to vote for them. Labour recorded an almost identical result, of 11.1%. Finally disunity in Alliance resulted in a reduction of 5.69% in the probability of respondents voting for them.

With controls however the effects for several of these parties vanish. The effect is most stark in the Netherlands, where only one party retains significance with a p-value of below 0.05 – the CDA. With controls the effect of disunity on the probability of voting for the party was to reduce the respondent's likelihood by 11.8%. The PvdA and VVD are close to this threshold however, with p-values of below 0.1. The reduction in likelihood of voting for these parties if you perceive them as disunited was 7.77% and 2.59% respectively. However even with this looser criteria however there was no observed effect for D66. It must be noted that the pseudo r-squared values for D66 was significantly lower than for the other three parties, so it is possible that traditional models of voting behaviour were simply poor at explaining why individuals supported the party in 1989.

VARIABLES	(1) PvdA 89	(2) CDA 89	(3) VVD 89	(4) D66 89	(5) PvdA 89	(6) CDA 89	(7) VVD 89	(8) D66 89
PvdA Disunity	-0.184*** (0.0276)				-0.0777* (0.0450)			
CDA Disunity		-0.202*** (0.0231)				-0.118*** (0.0385)		
VVD Disunity			-0.0803*** (0.0185)				-0.0259* (0.0135)	
D66 Disunity				-0.0794*** (0.0208)				-0.0223 (0.0307)
Govt Economic management positive					-0.162*** (0.0361)	0.0986*** (0.0325)	-0.0184 (0.0135)	0.0273* (0.0164)
PvdA ID					0.355*** (0.0899)			
CDA ID						0.456*** (0.0823)		
VVD ID							0.291*** (0.0980)	
D66 ID								0.346** (0.145)
PvdA LR proximity					-0.0824*** (0.0103)			
CDA LR proximity						-0.0735*** (0.0100)		
VVD LR proximity							-0.0255*** (0.00346)	
D66 LR proximity								-0.0356*** (0.00578)
PvdA 1986					0.597*** (0.0367)			

CDA 1986						0.641***		
						(0.0331)		
VVD 1986							0.405***	
							(0.0500)	
D66 1986								0.401***
								(0.0695)
female				-0.0445	0.0768**	0.00448		-0.00590
				(0.0355)	(0.0329)	(0.0116)		(0.0167)
							-	
age category				0.0124**	-0.00334	0.00685***		-0.00732**
				(0.00577)	(0.00521)	(0.00202)		(0.00291)
Observations	1,294	1,506	1,488	1,055	1,096	1,276	1,264	904
Pseudo R-squared	0.0212	0.0295	0.0194	0.0107	0.559	0.572	0.530	0.330

Standard errors in parentheses

\*\*\* p<0.01, \*\* p<0.05, \* p<0.1

Table 1 – Probit Baseline and Control for the Netherlands 1989. Percentage change in likelihood of having voted for that party if the independent variable changes by 1 is given over a coefficient

VARIABLES	(1) Labour 96	(2) National 96	(3) Alliance 96	(4) NZF 96	(5) Labour 96	(6) National 96	(7) Alliance 96	(8) NZF 96
Labour Disunity	-0.111*** (0.0204)				-0.0659** (0.0271)			
National Disunity		-0.228*** (0.0211)				-0.0701* (0.0364)		
Alliance Disunity			-0.0569*** (0.0132)				-0.0310** (0.0157)	
NZF Disunity				-0.112*** (0.0126)				-0.0694*** (0.0135)
Govt Economic management positive					-0.0846*** (0.0284)	0.111*** (0.0284)	-0.0431*** (0.0161)	-0.0446*** (0.0139)
Labour ID					0.447*** (0.0394)			
National ID						0.322*** (0.0393)		
Alliance ID							0.552*** (0.0737)	
NZF ID								0.660*** (0.0784)
Labour LR proximity					-0.0775*** (0.00761)			
National LR proximity						-0.0639*** (0.00728)		
Alliance LR proximity							-0.0140*** (0.00342)	
NZF LR proximity								-0.0318*** (0.00478)
Labour 1993					0.137*** (0.0331)			



National 1993					0.0889***			
					(0.0320)			
Alliance 1993							0.0959***	
							(0.0321)	
NZF 1993								0.183**
								(0.0755)
age				0.000839	-0.00210**	0.000337	0.00165***	
				(0.000860)	(0.000855)	(0.000463)	(0.000461)	
female				0.0419	0.0567**	-0.0131	0.00318	
				(0.0265)	(0.0257)	(0.0145)	(0.0141)	
Observations	2,152	2,152	2,152	2,152	1,303	1,303	1,252	1,206
Pseudo R-squared	0.0104	0.0278	0.0101	0.0308	0.416	0.406	0.328	0.335

Standard errors in parentheses

\*\*\* p<0.01, \*\* p<0.05, \* p<0.1

Table 2 – Probit Baseline and Control for New Zealand 1996. Percentage change in likelihood of having voted for that party if the independent variable changes by 1 is given over a coefficient

All controls performed generally as expected and in the expected direction of the relationship, with the exception of government economic management, which was insignificant for the VVD and D66 in the Netherlands. This may indicate that voters for these two parties – neither of which had realistic hopes of the prime ministry at that time, were potentially more concerned with issues other than economics when making their voting decisions.

In New Zealand the effect of cohesion on National disappears with controls, but remains for the other three parties. The p-value for National disunity however remains below 0.1. The percentage reduction in likelihood of voting for Labour, Alliance and NZF are 6.59%, 3.1% and 6.94% respectively. For National the reduction is 7.01%. All controls are significant and in the expected direction.

The relative risk ratios of the multinomial logit in general told a similar story in aggregate, but provided further information that the probit models do not. In the Netherlands the PvdA was used as the base category in the model. Predictably therefore, the odds of a respondent choosing to vote for any other party or not vote at all over choosing the PvdA increase considerably when the PvdA is perceived as disunited. This is always significant in the base model, and is least important for the VVD and not voting at all, where nonetheless the odds of respondents being in those categories over the PvdA increase by 2.532 and 2.615. The odds of being in any category other than these two when respondents perceive the PvdA as disunited increase by roughly 3.6. However perceiving the CDA as disunited reduce your odds of being in any category other than the PvdA – making respondents only 15% as likely to vote for the CDA over the PvdA in the baseline model for instance. Respondents perceiving the CDA as disunited were also only roughly half as likely to not vote at all or vote D66 over voting PvdA, and roughly only one third as likely to vote VVD or for any other party. The ratios for VVD disunity only tell a story for the VVD however, with respondents being only 46.8% as likely to vote VVD over PvdA if they saw the VVD as disunited. In the multinomial logit models D66 disunity is not even significant for the party in the baseline model, but is over not voting at all. It increases the odds of a respondent not voting at all over voting PvdA by 2.602. However this effect drops away with the introduction of controls.

In New Zealand the numbers differ but the overall results of the base model are similar. Perceiving Labour as disunited increases the odds of voting for any other party but does not increase your odds of not voting at all. Perceiving National as disunited make respondents only 12.6% as likely to vote for them over Labour. A perception of National disunity also reduces the odds of a respondent not voting or voting for a minor party over Labour to 39.4% and 29.7% what it was before. Disunity in Alliance and New Zealand First only seem to affect those parties in the baseline model. The odds

VARIABLES	Unity 89 No vote	Unity 89 CDA	Unity 89 VVD	Unity 89 D66	Unity 89 Others	Unity with Controls 89 No vote	Unity with Controls 89 CDA	Unity with Controls 89 VVD	Unity with Controls 89 D66	Unity with Controls 89 Others
PvdA Disunity	2.615*** (0.814)	3.628*** (1.056)	2.532** (0.934)	3.739*** (1.288)	3.706*** (1.317)	1.740 (1.086)	1.782 (0.939)	1.645 (1.003)	3.620*** (1.773)	1.951 (0.962)
CDA Disunity	0.481*** (0.121)	0.149*** (0.0448)	0.353*** (0.119)	0.540** (0.159)	0.348*** (0.120)	0.390* (0.209)	0.185*** (0.0973)	0.377* (0.215)	0.581 (0.244)	0.214*** (0.0961)
VVD Disunity	0.720 (0.150)	1.129 (0.222)	0.468*** (0.114)	1.472 (0.393)	0.972 (0.250)	0.541 (0.220)	0.868 (0.335)	0.552 (0.241)	1.190 (0.443)	1.063 (0.371)
D66 Disunity	2.602*** (0.874)	1.485 (0.532)	1.542 (0.674)	0.321* (0.209)	0.390 (0.255)	0.399 (0.348)	0.667 (0.448)	0.973 (0.710)	0.296 (0.254)	0.225* (0.188)
Govt Economic management positive						0.957 (0.399)	2.579** (1.013)	1.315 (0.611)	1.574 (0.567)	1.340 (0.475)
PvdA						0.285 (0.234)	9.71e-07 (0.000572)	7.68e-07 (0.000615)	0.180** (0.137)	0.0712** (0.0774)
CDA ID						1.55e-07 (0.000312)	3.930* (3.249)	0.973 (1.283)	0.356 (0.500)	3.11e-07 (0.000360)
VVD ID						0.280 (3,216)	5.278e+06 (2.647e+10)	4.683e+07 (2.349e+11)	1.897e+07 (9.514e+10)	0.269 (2,442)
D66 ID						21.82* (35.93)	3.17e-06 (0.00979)	2.31e-06 (0.00545)	45.17*** (60.26)	13.34* (20.53)
PvdA LR proximity						1.568*** (0.216)	1.531*** (0.201)	1.829*** (0.272)	1.479*** (0.194)	1.535*** (0.185)
CDA LR proximity						0.679*** (0.0911)	0.625*** (0.0803)	0.860 (0.127)	0.861 (0.0925)	0.892 (0.0913)
VVD LR proximity						1.011 (0.120)	0.932 (0.104)	0.602*** (0.0871)	1.052 (0.106)	1.241** (0.122)
D66 LR proximity						0.734* (0.129)	1.119 (0.168)	0.874 (0.149)	0.596*** (0.0968)	1.396** (0.184)
PvdA 1986						0.0917*** (0.0475)	0.0309*** (0.0335)	0.0284*** (0.0315)	0.191*** (0.0867)	0.0763*** (0.0305)
CDA 1986						0.658	11.47***	0.866	1.267	0.298*

						(0.418)	(5.952)	(0.559)	(0.758)	(0.185)
VVD 1986						0.561	3.571*	10.12***	3.819*	0.189*
						(0.552)	(2.698)	(7.475)	(2.825)	(0.184)
D66 1986						1.045	2.124	1.111	10.34***	0.795
						(0.838)	(1.721)	(1.094)	(6.518)	(0.617)
female						1.041	1.655	1.414	1.018	0.936
						(0.428)	(0.619)	(0.612)	(0.356)	(0.316)
age category						0.997	0.946	0.817**	0.861**	0.927
						(0.0665)	(0.0604)	(0.0647)	(0.0569)	(0.0531)
Constant	0.633***	0.788	0.549***	0.263***	0.352***	2.117	0.511	2.634	1.129	0.381
	(0.109)	(0.131)	(0.102)	(0.0618)	(0.0757)	(1.597)	(0.394)	(2.138)	(0.823)	(0.256)
Observations	954	954	954	954	954	813	813	813	813	813
Pseudo R-squared	0.0386	0.0386	0.0386	0.0386	0.0386	0.539	0.539	0.539	0.539	0.539

seEform in parentheses

\*\*\* p<0.01, \*\* p<0.05, \* p<0.1

Table 3 – Multinomial Logit results for the Netherlands 1989. PvdA is the baseline party for both basic model and model with controls. Relative risk ratios were given over coefficients.

VARIABLES	Unity 96 No vote	Unity 96 National	Unity 96 NZF	Unity 96 Alliance	Unity 96 Others	Unity with controls 96 No vote	Unity with controls 96 National	Unity with controls 96 NZF	Unity with controls 96 Alliance	Unity with controls 96 Others
Labour Disunity	1.094 (0.402)	2.883*** (0.458)	2.319*** (0.460)	2.901*** (0.604)	1.994*** (0.368)	1.845 (1.161)	1.976** (0.564)	1.583 (0.508)	2.157** (0.690)	1.564 (0.438)
National Disunity	0.394** (0.167)	0.126*** (0.0284)	1.173 (0.228)	0.760 (0.167)	0.297*** (0.0670)	0.469 (0.420)	0.548 (0.215)	1.915* (0.655)	1.017 (0.358)	0.781 (0.275)
Alliance Disunity	0.686 (0.287)	1.189 (0.202)	0.968 (0.227)	0.335*** (0.0979)	1.311 (0.253)	0.629 (0.472)	0.677 (0.210)	0.646 (0.238)	0.374** (0.154)	0.792 (0.238)
NZF Disunity	0.693 (0.253)	1.091 (0.171)	0.181*** (0.0511)	1.124 (0.240)	1.179 (0.211)	0.752 (0.501)	1.010 (0.299)	0.233*** (0.0952)	0.887 (0.296)	1.335 (0.380)
Govt Economic management positive						0.612 (0.441)	2.131*** (0.606)	0.666 (0.238)	0.842 (0.315)	1.695* (0.476)
Labour ID						0.0695** (0.0776)	0.284*** (0.115)	0.170*** (0.0680)	0.176*** (0.0613)	0.204*** (0.0727)
National ID						1.717 (1.435)	2.946*** (1.165)	0.573 (0.277)	0.405 (0.264)	0.645 (0.262)
Alliance ID						5.203* (5.207)	5.67e-07 (0.000874)	0.979 (0.868)	12.74*** (6.432)	0.524 (0.592)
NZF ID						4.402 (5.804)	1.069 (1.327)	23.65*** (16.32)	3.63e-07 (0.000528)	1.317 (1.306)
Labour LR proximity						1.770*** (0.307)	1.629*** (0.148)	1.598*** (0.163)	1.413*** (0.142)	1.488*** (0.132)
National LR proximity						0.738** (0.109)	0.589*** (0.0482)	0.951 (0.0687)	0.972 (0.0689)	0.704*** (0.0504)
Alliance LR proximity						0.770 (0.127)	1.142* (0.0888)	1.161* (0.101)	0.935 (0.0859)	1.277*** (0.0975)
NZF LR proximity						1.209 (0.202)	1.008 (0.0855)	0.673*** (0.0716)	1.072 (0.0908)	1.092 (0.0870)
Labour 1993						0.463 (0.318)	0.505* (0.202)	0.712 (0.309)	0.780 (0.319)	0.397** (0.145)
National 1993						0.398	1.277	1.654	0.857	1.010

						(0.329)	(0.515)	(0.778)	(0.438)	(0.392)
Alliance 1993						0.131*	0.288**	1.568	1.568	0.495
						(0.154)	(0.163)	(0.766)	(0.700)	(0.229)
NZF 1993						3.04e-06	1.036	4.598**	0.542	0.683
						(0.00189)	(0.857)	(3.296)	(0.643)	(0.568)
age						0.979	0.983*	1.016*	1.006	0.985*
						(0.0189)	(0.00859)	(0.00910)	(0.00916)	(0.00833)
female						0.601	1.388	0.875	0.595*	0.936
						(0.339)	(0.361)	(0.246)	(0.168)	(0.237)
Constant	0.178***	1.030	0.472***	0.315***	0.546***	0.947	1.430	0.189**	0.335*	1.420
	(0.0239)	(0.0741)	(0.0428)	(0.0326)	(0.0466)	(0.988)	(0.841)	(0.127)	(0.217)	(0.799)
Observations	2,152	2,152	2,152	2,152	2,152	1,157	1,157	1,157	1,157	1,157
Pseudo R-squared	0.0393	0.0393	0.0393	0.0393	0.0393	0.424	0.424	0.424	0.424	0.424

seEform in parentheses

\*\*\* p<0.01, \*\* p<0.05, \* p<0.1

Table 4 – Multinomial Logit results for New Zealand 1996. Labour is the baseline party for both basic model and model with controls. Relative risk ratios were given over coefficients

of respondents voting NZF over Labour are only 18.1% what they would be otherwise with a perception of NZF disunity. For Alliance the odds fall to 33.5% what they would otherwise have been.

With controls, like the probit models, see many of the variables lose significance in the Netherlands. Only CDA disunity and PvdA disunity continue to show statistical significance in the model. Being seen as disunited makes the odds of voting CDA over the PvdA fall to only 18.5% what they would have been otherwise. It also reduces the odds of voting for other parties over the PvdA to only 21.4% of the previous odds. PvdA disunity substantially increases the odds of voting D66 over the PvdA however. Respondents are 3.62 times more likely to vote D66 over the PvdA if they perceive it as disunited. There were two other instances of disunity with p-values above 0.05 but below 0.1. D66 disunity leaves respondents only 22.5% as likely to vote D66 over the PvdA. CDA disunity makes respondents only 37.7% as likely to vote for the VVD as well.

In New Zealand, only National was insignificant with controls. Labour disunity increased the odds of respondents voting for both National and Alliance, by 1.97 times and 2.157 times respectively. Alliance and NZF disunity affected the odds of respondents voting for them, but not for any other party. The odds of voting Alliance over Labour are only 37.4% of what they would have been otherwise if a respondent saw Alliance as disunited. For NZF the odds of voting for them over Labour were 23.3% what they would have been if the respondent saw the party as united. National disunity was almost significant for NZF, with a p-value above 0.05 but below 1.0. It increases the odds of voting NZF over Labour by 1.915. Once again, all controls are significant and in the expected direction.

## Analysis and Conclusion

These preliminary results indicate that there may be a relationship between perceptions of political party cohesion and the results those parties receive in elections. However this result is neither always consistent nor strong. Additionally disunity in some parties in the multinomial logit report significant results in parties other than the party to which they are referring. Both of these findings need to be examined in turn.

The more important of these results is the inconsistent importance of cohesion. While significant in most models – it falls quite far from achieving significant results for all parties in all models. Even when those effects can be found they are substantively quite small – something indicated by both the percentage change in likelihoods and the pseudo r-squared values of both probit and multinomial logit models. However, this is not a particularly surprising finding. It was never claimed that party cohesion was a vitally important aspect of voter decision making – on a par with party identification and government economic performance. Rather it was hoped to establish that voters do take this factor into account when casting their votes generally, and that voters are aware of it and respond to it.

Furthermore the inconsistency of the results, both in terms of significance and the substantive strength when significant may indicate that there is a salience effect. It may be that voters only take a factor like cohesion into account under certain circumstances, and ignore it when those conditions are not met. Participation in Government in the Netherlands would seem to be the biggest single explanatory factor for the observed results. When in government anything that affects the ability of the government to carry out its manifesto is likely to be of importance to voters. Voters cared about cohesion because low cohesion may have negatively affected government performance. As the CDA was the primary government party this would explain why substantively this was the party most affected by cohesion. It would also account for why cohesion in the CDA was negatively affecting the VVD. As the junior coalition partner, it makes sense that a factor that negatively affects government performance would impact on evaluations that voters would have of them as well. Additionally, if governmental status is driving the importance of the cohesion variable it makes sense that the perceived cohesion of the senior coalition partner would be substantively more important than that of the junior.

In New Zealand however there were matters that were less ordinary in 1996, so simple governmental status could have superseded other matters. 1996 was the first election that was fought in New Zealand under a proportional electoral system. This however did not affect both



major parties evenly. Labour, in spite of being in opposition, was significantly more badly affected than National. Two relatively major new parties were formed by Labour MPs prior to the election – the centrist United Party and the libertarian ACT New Zealand, which had two former cabinet ministers, including a former finance minister among its supporters. Furthermore, these splits in Labour were reflections of longer divisions in the party over policy direction from the 1980s onwards over the validity and efficacy of monetarist ‘Rogernomics’ (named after finance minister Roger Douglas) (Curtis & Miller, 2012a, 2012b). National was not nearly so divided.

Salience and context seems to matter too in the fate of smaller parties. Alliance in New Zealand in particular records a substantively much weaker effect than that of any other party for whom significant results were found. However Alliance is not really a party in the sense that we understand it in 1996. Rather it was a coalition between four different parties to jointly contest elections and ensure some representation under first-past-the-post that stayed in operation owing to the 5% threshold under the new proportional system. These parties while generally on the left, varied in ideological focus. This means both that voters may expect Alliance to be particularly uncohesive regardless by its nature, and had already factored that into their base evaluations of the parties before even considering which party to vote for. This would make a perception of disunity in Alliance unsurprising and unlikely to really affect a respondents vote while a similar perception in Labour would do major damage.

The other important result was the impact of cohesion of one party had on other parties. This occurred a number of times. In the Netherlands CDA cohesion affected the VVD, as already mentioned, PvdA disunity affected D66 and D66 disunity affected votes for other parties. In New Zealand National disunity affected NZF while Labour disunity had an impact on Alliance and National votes. This set of effects indicate, once again, that voters may view cohesion as important but it may not necessarily that matters in absolute terms when casting a vote. This is because of the kind of party each other party is affecting. For instance in New Zealand it makes sense that the cohesion of National, as the main centre-right party, affects NZF as a smaller party further to its right, but not Alliance, to its left. Similarly Labour cohesion affecting Alliance and National is also logical if cohesion is a factor, but not the primary factor, for voters making decision. This is because, based on ideological proximity, these are the parties we would expect voters to actually choose between based on their positions on the ideological spectrum. A voter who is left wing would never consider voting for National or NZF under any circumstance – so their perceptions as to their cohesion will not make the slightest difference as to how they will vote. However knowing what they already believe and taking other factors into account they may be willing to consider either Labour or Alliance.

Therefore only after they already narrowed down their options by other means does this factor come into effect.

The same effect can be observed in the Netherlands – providing an alternative explanation for the effect the CDA has on the VVD and accounting for the effect the PvdA has on D66, a left-liberal party that is ideologically close to it (D66, 2014.). The effect that CDA and D66 disunity has on other parties is easily accounted for as well using this logic. In the Netherlands in 1989 other parties were predominantly Green Left, a green party that had a lot in common with D66, and several small evangelical protestant parties that shared a voter base with the CDA.

However it is important not to overstate these results. These arguments provide possible explanations for these findings, but the inconsistency of those same findings place mean that they certainly cannot be regarded as anything other than indicative.

In order to try to obtain some firmer empirical findings a number of avenues for future research are possible. The first avenue is to operationalise cohesion differently. There are a number of ways of potentially doing this. The first is to use the standard measure of parliamentary voting unity, which has numerous problems relating to a lack of variation as already discussed. The second possible approach is to create an expert study and ask those who already know about the parties in a certain country how cohesive they were in given contests and build a dataset of observable cohesion that way. This has the problem of occurring retrospectively in the minds of respondents, so responses could be tainted. It may also be difficult just to get a viable number of respondents. The third possible approach would be to directly take instances of cohesion from newspapers and construct a measure of ‘objective’ cohesion independent of parliamentary votes. This approach has problems with replicability and its extremely time consuming nature in order to construct an adequate sample size.

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## Appendix

### Australia 1987

VARIABLES	(1) Labor 87	(2) Liberal 87	(3) National 87	(4) Labor 87	(5) Liberal 87	(6) National 87
Labor Disunity	-0.334*** (0.0270)			-0.203*** (0.0528)		
Liberal Disunity		-0.125*** (0.0235)			-0.0586* (0.0342)	
National Disunity			-0.0328** (0.0141)			-0.00329 (0.0144)
Govt Economic management positive				0.254*** (0.0392)	-0.231*** (0.0313)	0.0431*** (0.0138)
Labor ID				0.588*** (0.0308)		
Liberal ID					0.467*** (0.0360)	
National ID						0.366*** (0.0702)
Labor LR proximity				0.0516*** (0.00974)		
Liberal LR proximity					-0.0236** (0.00937)	
National LR proximity						-0.00673* (0.00358)
Labor 1983				0.325*** (0.0406)		
Liberal 1983					0.335*** (0.0396)	

National 1983						0.404*** (0.0748)
age				-0.00133 (0.00121)	0.000557 (0.000970)	-0.000164 (0.000421)
female				0.0139 (0.0375)	-0.0266 (0.0308)	-0.000753 (0.0131)
Observations	1,830	1,830	1,830	1,491	1,414	1,337
Pseudo R-squared	0.0457	0.0125	0.00531	0.571	0.487	0.408

Standard errors in parentheses

\*\*\* p<0.01, \*\* p<0.05, \* p<0.1

Table 5 – Probit Baseline and Control for the Australia 1987. Percentage change in likelihood of having voted for that party if the independent variable changes by 1 is given over a coefficient



VARIABLES	Unity 87 No vote	Unity 87 Liberal	Unity 87 National	Unity 87 Others	Unity with Controls 87 No vote	Unity with Controls 87 Liberal	Unity with Controls 87 National	Unity with Controls 87 Others
Labor Disunity	2.447** (1.054)	5.366*** (0.878)	5.337*** (1.204)	3.169*** (0.847)	3.671** (2.368)	3.396*** (1.070)	1.766 (0.746)	1.631 (0.631)
Liberal Disunity	0.632 (0.204)	0.415*** (0.0547)	0.493*** (0.102)	0.525*** (0.122)	2.176 (1.343)	0.551** (0.149)	1.090 (0.404)	0.806 (0.268)
National Disunity	0.330*** (0.111)	1.073 (0.139)	0.754 (0.153)	1.525* (0.360)	0.294** (0.164)	1.356 (0.365)	1.002 (0.358)	1.876* (0.633)
Govt Economic management positive					0.614 (0.357)	0.186*** (0.0560)	0.314** (0.142)	0.380*** (0.120)
Labor ID					0.0564*** (0.0330)	0.138*** (0.0465)	0.0787*** (0.0408)	0.0880*** (0.0295)
Liberal ID					0.397 (0.297)	5.921*** (2.011)	1.362 (0.594)	0.878 (0.354)
National ID					4.18e-08 (0.000176)	1.740 (1.191)	8.237*** (5.448)	0.588 (0.499)
Labor LR proximity					1.198 (0.238)	0.839** (0.0727)	0.992 (0.118)	0.942 (0.0967)
Liberal LR proximity					1.191 (0.170)	1.362*** (0.0831)	1.195** (0.0938)	1.324*** (0.0953)
National LR proximity					0.767 (0.141)	1.013 (0.0794)	0.871 (0.0993)	1.095 (0.103)
Labor 1983					0.0900*** (0.0507)	0.651 (0.238)	0.370* (0.188)	0.201*** (0.0707)
Liberal 1983					4.40e-08 (3.42e-05)	2.016* (0.794)	1.299 (0.663)	0.227*** (0.104)
National 1983					1.35e-09 (1.86e-05)	0.461 (0.371)	8.193*** (6.269)	0.280 (0.257)
age					1.025 (0.0160)	1.009 (0.00755)	1.002 (0.0104)	1.007 (0.00901)
female					1.536	0.779	0.943	1.220

					(0.758)	(0.175)	(0.291)	(0.323)
Constant	0.123*** (0.0272)	0.873 (0.0886)	0.258*** (0.0391)	0.141*** (0.0271)	0.429 (0.372)	0.674 (0.338)	0.500 (0.321)	0.792 (0.431)
Observations	1,830	1,830	1,830	1,830	1,311	1,311	1,311	1,311
Pseudo R-squared	0.0469	0.0469	0.0469	0.0469	0.500	0.500	0.500	0.500

seEform in parentheses

\*\*\* p<0.01, \*\* p<0.05, \* p<0.1

Table 6 – Multinomial Logit results for Australia 1987. Labor is the baseline party for both basic model and model with controls. Relative risk ratios were given over coefficients

## Australia 1990

VARIABLES	(1) Labor 90	(2) Liberal 90	(3) Labor 90	(4) Liberal 90
Labor Disunity	-0.378*** (0.0192)		-0.220*** (0.0332)	
Liberal Disunity		-0.210*** (0.0221)		-0.108*** (0.0293)
Govt Economic management positive			0.322*** (0.0635)	-0.238*** (0.0411)
Labor ID			0.536*** (0.0284)	
Liberal ID				-0.327*** (0.0277)
Labor LR proximity			0.00572 (0.0104)	
Liberal LR proximity				-0.0469*** (0.0116)
Labor 1987			0.378*** (0.0307)	
Liberal 1987				0.529*** (0.0293)
age			0.000270 (0.000905)	-0.000382 (0.000813)
female			0.0242 (0.0294)	-0.0483* (0.0274)
Observations	2,037	2,037	1,787	1,787
Pseudo R-squared	0.0801	0.0337	0.547	0.473

Standard errors in parentheses

\*\*\* p<0.01, \*\* p<0.05, \* p<0.1

Table 7 – Probit Baseline and Control for the Australia 1990. Percentage change in likelihood of having voted for that party if the independent variable changes by 1 is given over a coefficient

VARIABLES	Unity 90 No vote	Unity 90 Liberal	Unity 90 Others	Unity with Controls 90 No vote	Unity with Controls 90 Liberal	Unity with Controls 90 Others
Labor Disunity	9.054*** (3.268)	11.52*** (2.216)	7.942*** (1.624)	4.913*** (2.407)	4.410*** (1.303)	4.161*** (1.152)
Liberal Disunity	0.482** (0.146)	0.290*** (0.0331)	0.613*** (0.0810)	0.837 (0.357)	0.517*** (0.103)	0.989 (0.187)
Govt Economic management positive				7.23e-07 (0.000507)	0.0817*** (0.0471)	0.349*** (0.108)
Labor ID				0.165*** (0.0901)	0.0429*** (0.00988)	0.0818*** (0.0162)
Liberal ID				-	-	-
Labor LR proximity				0.917 (0.123)	0.994 (0.0710)	0.890* (0.0603)
Liberal LR proximity				1.083 (0.163)	0.773*** (0.0635)	0.985 (0.0683)
Labor 1987				0.0237*** (0.0153)	0.421*** (0.121)	0.140*** (0.0333)
Liberal 1987				0.266** (0.141)	6.448*** (2.192)	0.340*** (0.114)
age				1.036*** (0.0111)	0.998 (0.00575)	0.997 (0.00528)
female				0.761 (0.307)	0.786 (0.148)	0.984 (0.167)
Constant	0.0765*** (0.0185)	1.378*** (0.122)	0.572*** (0.0627)	0.261 (0.233)	11.27*** (5.158)	16.31*** (6.747)
Observations	2,037	2,037	2,037	1,787	1,787	1,787
Pseudo R-squared	0.0740	0.0740	0.0740	0.443	0.443	0.443

seEform in parentheses

\*\*\* p<0.01, \*\* p<0.05, \* p<0.1

Table 8 – Multinomial Logit results for Australia 1987. Labor is the baseline party for both basic model and model with controls. Relative risk ratios were given over coefficients

## New Zealand 1990

VARIABLES	(1) Labour 90	(2) National 90	(3) Labour 90	(4) National 90
Labour Disunity	-0.232*** (0.0229)		-0.141*** (0.0301)	
National Disunity		-0.316*** (0.0207)		-0.194*** (0.0340)
Govt Economic management positive			0.229** (0.0909)	-0.226** (0.0892)
Labour ID			0.455*** (0.0333)	
National ID				0.471*** (0.0341)
Labour LR proximity			-0.0538*** (0.0105)	
National LR proximity				-0.0875*** (0.0137)
Labour 1987			0.275*** (0.0271)	
National 1987				0.465*** (0.0325)
age			-0.00155** (0.000762)	0.000694 (0.000982)
female			0.000278 (0.0249)	-0.00509 (0.0325)
Observations	2,102	2,102	1,603	1,607
Pseudo R-squared	0.0426	0.0663	0.373	0.460

Standard errors in parentheses

\*\*\* p<0.01, \*\* p<0.05, \* p<0.1

Table 9 – Probit Baseline and Control for the New Zealand 1990. Percentage change in likelihood of having voted for that party if the independent variable changes by 1 is given over a coefficient



VARIABLES	Unity 90 No vote	Unity 90 National	Unity 90 Other	Unity with Controls 90 No vote	Unity with Controls 90 National	Unity with Controls 90 Other
Labour Disunity	1.354*	5.312***	2.953***	1.445	2.350***	2.511***
	(0.234)	(0.680)	(0.462)	(0.343)	(0.495)	(0.503)
National Disunity	0.753	0.160***	0.719**	0.981	0.342***	0.923
	(0.131)	(0.0212)	(0.103)	(0.227)	(0.0727)	(0.169)
Govt Economic management positive				0.387	0.153**	0.467
				(0.252)	(0.112)	(0.233)
Labour ID				0.331***	0.0984***	0.155***
				(0.0897)	(0.0279)	(0.0330)
National ID				1.936	7.403***	1.117
				(0.899)	(2.772)	(0.477)
Labour LR proximity				1.353***	1.577***	1.366***
				(0.137)	(0.139)	(0.112)
National LR proximity				0.885	0.608***	0.983
				(0.0774)	(0.0503)	(0.0649)
Labour 1987				0.298***	0.856	0.481***
				(0.0773)	(0.199)	(0.0994)
National 1987				1.420	9.514***	1.244
				(0.601)	(3.348)	(0.473)
age				0.982**	1.005	1.003
				(0.00737)	(0.00608)	(0.00556)
female				1.025	1.061	0.971
				(0.225)	(0.200)	(0.170)
Constant	0.296***	0.773**	0.307***	1.116	0.636	0.641
	(0.0407)	(0.0806)	(0.0411)	(0.411)	(0.211)	(0.200)
Observations	2,042	2,042	2,042	1,563	1,563	1,563
Pseudo R-squared	0.0788	0.0788	0.0788	0.364	0.364	0.364

seEform in parentheses

\*\*\* p<0.01, \*\* p<0.05, \* p<0.1

Table 10 – Multinomial Logit results for New Zealand 1990. Labour is the baseline party for both basic model and model with controls. Relative risk ratios were given over coefficients

## New Zealand 1993

VARIABLES	(5) Labour 93	-6 National 93	-7 Alliance 93	(9) NZF 93	(1) Labour 93	(2) National 93	(3) Alliance 93	(4) NZF 93
Labour Disunity	-0.110*** (0.0197)				-0.0162 (0.0300)			
National Disunity		-0.201*** (0.0194)				-0.0889** (0.0367)		
Alliance Disunity			-0.0814*** (0.0215)				-0.0766** (0.0316)	
NZF Disunity				-0.0734*** (0.00926)				-0.0493 (0.0325)
Govt Economic management positive					-0.182*** (0.0277)	0.223*** (0.0379)	-0.110*** (0.0259)	-0.00440 (0.0207)
Labour ID					0.466*** (0.0433)			
National ID						0.450*** (0.0412)		
Alliance ID							0.537*** (0.0717)	
NZF ID								0.692*** (0.106)
Labour LR proximity					-0.0680*** (0.0124)			
National LR proximity						-0.110*** (0.0155)		
Alliance LR proximity							-0.0788*** (0.0111)	
NZF LR proximity								-0.0480*** (0.00943)
Labour 1990					0.223*** (0.0373)			
National 1990						0.204*** (0.0413)		

age					-0.000600 (0.000955)	0.00318*** (0.00123)	0.000528 (0.000812)	0.000704 (0.000628)
female					-0.00465 (0.0314)	-0.0317 (0.0402)	-0.0297 (0.0262)	0.0195 (0.0227)
Observations	2,251	2,251	2,251	2,251	1,155	1,151	1,040	769
Pseudo R-squared	0.0106	0.0327	0.00524	0.0131	0.383	0.490	0.195	0.193

Standard errors in parentheses

\*\*\* p<0.01, \*\* p<0.05, \* p<0.1

Table 11 – Probit Baseline and Control for the New Zealand 1993. Percentage change in likelihood of having voted for that party if the independent variable changes by 1 is given over a coefficient

VARIABLES	Unity 93 No vote	Unity 93 National	Unity 93 Alliance	Unity 93 NZF	Unity 93 Others	Unity with controls 93 No vote	Unity with controls 93 National	Unity with controls 93 Alliance	Unity with controls 93 NZF	Unity with controls 93 Others
Labour Disunity	0.877 (0.199)	3.033*** (0.401)	1.788*** (0.267)	1.789*** (0.351)	3.137*** (1.015)	1.306 (0.633)	1.285 (0.442)	1.122 (0.351)	0.704 (0.271)	3.114* (2.055)
National Disunity	0.680** (0.132)	0.236*** (0.0321)	0.808 (0.112)	1.125 (0.206)	0.408** (0.142)	0.960 (0.475)	0.491** (0.175)	0.835 (0.256)	1.108 (0.415)	0.382 (0.251)
Alliance Disunity	1.078 (0.318)	1.321 (0.242)	0.564** (0.140)	0.982 (0.295)	1.638 (0.697)	1.686 (1.012)	0.629 (0.307)	0.900 (0.426)	0.787 (0.441)	2.721 (2.077)
NZF Disunity	1.116 (0.430)	1.507* (0.355)	1.038 (0.311)	0.0924** (0.0947)	1.530 (0.827)	1.957 (1.926)	2.626 (2.090)	2.476 (1.892)	0.915 (1.111)	4.472 (4.945)
Govt Economic management positive						3.021** (1.578)	3.485*** (1.317)	1.559 (0.614)	2.568** (1.100)	1.191 (0.878)
Labour ID						0.523 (0.323)	0.166*** (0.0932)	0.0799*** (0.0319)	0.110*** (0.0609)	3.74e-08 (5.29e-05)
National ID						2.003 (1.366)	10.31*** (4.852)	0.964 (0.501)	1.192 (0.643)	1.999 (1.493)
Alliance ID						2.183 (2.644)	5.19e-07 (0.000892)	3.157** (1.668)	4.65e-08 (0.000144)	1.072 (1.334)
NZF ID						1.013 (72,897)	1.013e+09 (2.628e+13)	1.249e+09 (3.239e+13)	1.174e+10 (3.045e+14)	0.823 (40,148)
Labour LR proximity						1.652** (0.335)	1.964*** (0.288)	1.782*** (0.229)	1.927*** (0.302)	1.130 (0.286)
National LR proximity						0.493*** (0.107)	0.387*** (0.0623)	0.713*** (0.0922)	0.632*** (0.104)	1.335 (0.356)
Alliance LR proximity						0.879 (0.187)	0.912 (0.136)	0.530*** (0.0769)	0.884 (0.146)	1.108 (0.287)
NZF LR proximity						1.038 (0.227)	0.946 (0.151)	1.034 (0.133)	0.501*** (0.0981)	0.930 (0.252)
Labour 1990						0.404 (0.256)	0.719 (0.371)	0.560* (0.196)	0.533 (0.263)	0.147* (0.169)
National 1990						0.773	1.903	0.779	1.162	1.317

						(0.488)	(0.882)	(0.308)	(0.549)	(0.943)
age						1.007	0.985	1.020**	1.013	0.966*
						(0.0164)	(0.0113)	(0.00967)	(0.0123)	(0.0199)
female						2.656**	0.764	1.140	1.614	2.420
						(1.254)	(0.284)	(0.340)	(0.593)	(1.482)
Constant	0.300***	1.141*	0.597***	0.221***	0.0627***	0.203	2.858	1.247	0.830	0.204
	(0.0330)	(0.0819)	(0.0511)	(0.0270)	(0.0131)	(0.224)	(2.151)	(0.821)	(0.690)	(0.280)
Observations	2,204	2,204	2,204	2,204	2,204	733	733	733	733	733
Pseudo R-squared	0.0364	0.0364	0.0364	0.0364	0.0364	0.422	0.422	0.422	0.422	0.422

seEform in parentheses

\*\*\* p<0.01, \*\* p<0.05, \* p<0.1

Table 12 – Multinomial Logit results for New Zealand 1993. Labour is the baseline party for both basic model and model with controls. Relative risk ratios were given over coefficients